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Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice

  • Издателство: Waveland Press
  • ISBN / UPC: 0881333670

Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice

  • Издателство: Waveland Press
  • ISBN / UPC: 0881333670

Либерализмът срещу популизма: Конфронтация между теорията за демокрацията и теорията за социалния избор (книга на английски език)

 

William H. Riker  (автор)

 

Издателство:   Waveland Press
Език: английски език
Раздел: Социология и политология

 

Мека корица, голям формат  |  311 стр.  |  461 гр. 

(неизползвана, здрава и чиста книга с леко захабен външен вид)

 

*

 

Contents
 
 
Preface ix
Analytical Table of Contents xi
 
 
1.  The Connection Between the Theory of Social Choice and the Theory of Democracy 1
 
l.A   The Attainability of Justice 3
l.B   The Elements of Democracy 4
Participation 5
Liberty 6
Equality 7
l.C   The Meaning of Democracy 8
l.D   The Liberal Interpretation of Voting 8
l.E   The Populist Interpretation of Voting   11
l.F   Differences Between Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting 12
l.G   The Vitality of the Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting 14
1. H   The Paradox of Voting 16
 
 
2. Different Choices from Identical Values 21
 
2. A   Evidence from Elections 22
2. B   Evidence from Experiment 29
 
 
3. Simple Majority Decision 41
 
3.A   Introductory Definitions 42
3.B   Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Monotonicity 45
3.C   Violations of Monotonicity 47
Social Choices Operating on Two Alternatives 47
Social Choices Operating on More Than Two Alternatives 48
3.D   Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Undifferentiatedness (Anonymity) 51
3.E   Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Neutrality 56
3.F   Simple Majority Decision and Fairness 58
3. G   Democratic Thought About Simple Majority Decision 59
 
 
4. Voting Methods with Three or More Alternatives 65
 
4. A   Some Preliminaries 66
4.B   Majoritarian Methods of Voting 67
4.C   Examples of Majoritarian Methods 69
The Amendment Procedure 69
The Successive Procedure 73
Runoff Elections 74
The Copeland Rule 76
The Schwartz Rule 76
The Kemeny Rule 76
Conclusions   81
4.D   Positional Methods of Voting   81
4.E   Examples of Positional Methods 85
Plurality Voting 85
Approval Voting 88
The Borda Count 90
Conclusions   91
4.F   Utilitarian Methods of Voting 95
4.G   Examples of Utilitarian Methods 98
Summation of Cardinal Utility 98
Demand-revealing Methods 98
Multiplication of Utilities 98
Conclusions 98
4.H  Criteria for Judging Voting Methods 99
Undifferentiatedness 99
Neutrality 99
Monotonicity 100
The Condorcet Criterion 100
Consistency   100
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 101
4.1    Judgments on Voting Methods 101
Minor Violations of Fairness 101
Violation of Consistency by Majoritarian Methods 102
Violation of Independence by the Borda Count 105
Violation of Undifferentiatedness by Approval Voting 105
Violation of Independence by Utilitarian Methods 110
4. J   The Absence of True and Fair Amalgamations   111
 
 
5. The Meaning of Social Choices 115
 
5.A   Arrow's Theorem 115
5.B   The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem: The Frequency of Cycles   119
5.C   The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem: Conditions for Condorcet Winners 123
5.D   The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Independence   129
5.E   The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Transitivity 130
5.F   The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem:
Conditions on Social Choice 132
5. G   The Absence of Meaning   136
 
 
6. The Manipulation of Social Choices: Strategic Voting 137
 
6. A   The Elements of Manipulation 138
6.B   The Universality of Strategic Voting 141
6.C   Examples of Strategic Voting 145
In Plurality Voting 145
In an Open Primary 145
In Union Elections 151
In the U.S. House of Representatives 152
6.D The Consequences of Strategic Voting 156
6.E   Vote-trading 157
6. F   The Ineradicability of Strategic Voting 167
 
 
7. The Manipulation of Social Choices: Control of the Agenda 169
 
7. A   The Universality of Agenda Control 170
7.B   Examples of Agenda Control 173
In the Roman Senate 173
In a Contemporary Laboratory 174
7.C   The Paucity of Equilibria 181
Disequilibrium in Three Dimensions 182
Conditions for Equilibrium 185
Complete Disequilibrium 186
7.D   Practical Stability and Theoretical Instability 188
7.E   The Fragility of Equilibria: An Example of the Introduction of New Alternatives to Generate Disequilibrium 192
The Natural Selection of Political Issues: An Interpretation of Political Disequilibrium 197
8.A   Disappointments with Disequilibria 198
8.B   Voting Disequilibrium: What It Means to Lose 201
Losing Economically 201
Losing Politically 202
8.C   Voting Disequilibrium: The Quantity and Quality of Political Dissatisfaction 206
8.D   The Consequences of Dissatisfaction: A Model of Political Change 208
8.E   The Natural Selection of Issues 209
8. F   Structural Regularities in Natural Selection 211
 
 
9. Manipulation and the Natural Selection of Issues: The Development of the Issue of Slavery as a Prelude to the American Civil War 213
 
9.A   The Appearance of Slavery as a National Political Issue 214
9.B   Slavery as an Issue from the Ratification of the Constitution Through the Missouri Compromise 215
9.C   From the Missouri Compromise to the Gag Rule 219
9.D   The Wilmot Proviso 223
9.E   From the Wilmot Proviso to the Civil War 227
 
 
10. Liberalism, Populism, and the Theory of Social Choice 233
 
10.A   The Adequacy of Voting 233
10.B   The Rejection of Populism 238
10.C   The Survival of Liberalism and Democracy 241
10.D   Are Liberal and Populist Interpretations Compatible? 246
10.E   The Preservation of Liberal Democracy 249
 
 
Notes 255
Glossary 293
Bibliography 299
Index 307
 

**

 

Preface

 

In this book I have used social choice theory to explicate the theory of democracy. In particular, I have examined the feasibility of the political ideal of democracy in terms of the practical constraints that the social choice analysis reveals concerning various democratic aspirations. There­fore, this book is written for three kinds of readers: political philosophers, students of political institutions, and beginning students of social choice theory.

 

For political philosophers, I hope it will demonstrate the inescapable relevance of the social choice analysis to the normative concerns of politi­cal philosophy. Unfortunately very few political philosophers have hereto­fore recognized this relevance, possibly because social choice theory has usually been cast in mathematical form, thereby suggesting that it is merely a technical exercise. By showing that important themes from the social choice literature necessarily enter into philosophic discourse and by presenting these themes wholly in nonmathematical terms, I show the importance of the theory of social choice.

 

For students of political institutions, this book will demonstrate that analytic theory can help in the interpretation of events. One central ques­tion of political description—a question much disputed but little under­stood—is the problem of explaining why some issues are politically salient and others not. This problem has usually been investigated by reducing politics to something else—to economics, for example, as in Marxism, or to psychology, as in psychoanalytic visualizations—thereby producing an economic (or psychological) interpretation of politics. However, in Chap­ters 8 and 9,1 offer a political interpretation of politics, a theory about the rise and decline of the salience of issues that derives directly from social choice theory and is entirely political in form. This theory is an extension into political description of the rational choice model of individual deci­sion that underlies social choice theory. At the same time, my theory utilizes some of the main discoveries of social choice theory to describe politics generally.

 

For beginning students of social choice theory—a category that should, I believe, include most beginning students of political science— this book will serve to introduce both the main topics of inquiry and the main conclusions so far arrived at in this theory. Since, as I have already noted, it has usually been presented in a fairly formidable mathematical form, many college freshmen and sophomores have probably not under­stood the intellectual motivation for the theory. I have summarized the main topics and related them to political philosophy and the description of politics. This will help beginning students to appreciate the importance— and even the elegance—of the theory of social choice.

 

I began to think about the theme of this book when 1 was a Fairchild Fellow at the California Institute of Technology, and I was given the opportunity to write it by the Scaife Family Charitable Trust. I deeply appreciate the support from both these endowments. So many friends have helped me to understand the topics in this book that I cannot thank them all. But I must single out for public appreciation Duncan Black, Gerald Kramer, Steven Brams, Richard McKelvey, Peter Ordeshook, John Ferejohn, Richard Kronick, Darrell Dobbs, James Enelow, Gideon Doron, Raymond Jean, and especially Kenneth Shepsle, whose criticisms of the first formulation of the theme of this book (at a conference in 1976 sponsored by the Mathematical Social Science Board) have been a con­stant warning and whose comments on the final formulation have clarified many a paragraph, Jeffrey Richelson, whose dissertation "A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions" (University of Rochester, 1975) provided one main point of departure, Charles Plott, whose seminar at Cal Tech gave me a chance to converse with him and others about most of these issues, both analytic and normative, and Richard Niemi, whose inci­sive criticisms of every page have greatly benefited both me and my readers.

 

At various stages in the writing of this book, Janice Brown, Donna French, Hilda Porter, Doris Smith, and Claire Sundeen have helped me with typing, and Mary Riker with the drawings, more than I can ade­quately thank them.

 

William H. Riker

July 1981                                                                                       

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В наличност:
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Език
английски
Автор
William H. Riker
Издателство
Waveland Press
Град
Prospect Heights, Illinois, USA
Година
1988
Страници
311
Състояние
неизползвана книга
ЗАБЕЛЕЖКА
здрава и чиста книга с леко захабен външен вид
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мека
Формат
голям
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Дебелина (мм)
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Тегло (гр.)
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